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THE FINALITY OF UNMODIFIED APPELLATE
COMMISSIONER RULINGS IN WASHINGTON STATE
Aurora R. Bearse*
Abstract: In Washington appellate courts, unelected court commissioners handle most of
the motion practice. Some motions are minor and mostly procedural, but other motions touch
on the scope of the appeal or its merits. Because commissioners have the power to shape the
course of an appeal, the Washington Rules of Appellate Procedure allow parties to internally
appeal any commissioner decision to a panel of elected judges, via what is called a “motion to
modify” under RAP 17.7. If a panel modifies a commissioner’s ruling, the panel’s decision
becomes the final decision of the court on that issue. Similarly, multiple opinions recognize
that an unmodified commissioner ruling also becomes the final decision on issues raised in a
motion. Nevertheless, at times, appellate panels have ignored or amended earlier unmodified
commissioner motion rulings, often without detailed explanation. This Essay explores opinions
in which panels considered the court bound by unmodified commissioner rulings and when
they did not. It reviews in detail those opinions where panels ignored or altered unmodified
commissioner rulings and the reasons panels gave for doing so, if any. And it concludes with
a recommendation that absent a clearly articulated and compelling reason, an appellate panel
should follow the rule that a commissioner’s unmodified ruling is the court’s own—a concept
that this Essay calls “the rule of ruling finality.”

INTRODUCTION
In the Washington State Court of Appeals, appellate commissioners
handle most of the motion practice. Although they are unelected creatures
of the appellate court rules,1 their decisions on motions can have a
significant effect on the outcome of an appeal. So to preserve the right to

*

The author serves as a commissioner for Division Two of the Washington State Court of Appeals.
Before her appointment, Commissioner Bearse was an administrative law judge for the Washington
State Office of Administrative Hearings. She was also a staff attorney for Division Two, an assistant
appellate federal public defender, and an associate securities litigation attorney at Weil, Gotshal &
Manges LLC. She clerked for Judge Robert R. Beezer (9th Cir.) and Judge William H. Walls (DNJ).
Opinions expressed in this Essay are not an official position of the court of appeals.
1. Wolfe v. Wolfe, 99 Wash. 2d 531, 534–35, 663 P.2d 469, 471 (1983) (describing the creation of
the commissioner position) (“The Supreme Court established the position of Commissioner in 1976
by the Rules of Appellate Procedure [(RAP)] and defined it further in Court of Appeals Administrative
Rule (CAR) 16(c). The Commissioner has broad authority to hear and decide motions authorized by
RAP 17.2 and 18.9(b) as well as any additional motions that may be assigned to that officer by the
Court of Appeals. CAR 16(c)(1). The Court of Appeals Administrative Rules also provide that the
duties of the Commissioner may be increased or altered by the Court of Appeals and that all duties
carried out by the Commissioner are for the benefit of the court as a whole. CAR 16(c)(7).”).

1

Bearse (Do Not Delete)

2

3/25/2022 9:41 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[Vol. 97:1

review by a panel of elected judges,2 a party can request that a panel
review any commissioner decision by timely filing a motion to modify.3
If modified, the panel decision is the final decision on the motion.
But what about an unmodified4 commissioner decision? Myriad
opinions support that the commissioner’s decision should be the court’s
final decision5—but some do not,6 and they rarely explain why. This gray
area in appellate practice should be eliminated in all but the rarest, and
clearly delineated, circumstances.
This Essay provides an overview of the appellate commissioners’
duties.7 It discusses how appellate panels treat earlier commissioner
rulings8 and provides examples of when panels considered the court
bound by these rulings and when they did not. It categorizes those
opinions in which panels ignored or altered unmodified commissioner
rulings. And it concludes with a recommendation that absent a clearly
articulated reason, an appellate panel should follow the existing rule that
a commissioner’s unmodified ruling is the court’s own—a concept that
this Essay calls “the rule of ruling finality.”
I.

APPELLATE COMMISSIONERS AND THEIR RULINGS

Appellate commissioners can rule on all motions filed under the
Washington Rules of Appellate Procedure (RAPs),9 except for those that
the rules refer to a panel of three elected judges of the court of appeals.10
Functionally, this means that court commissioners have the authority to
2. Id. at 535, 663 P.2d at 471 (“[I]f a losing party does not like the Commissioner’s ruling, one is
not forced to accept it. Upon making a motion to modify pursuant to RAP 17.7, petitioner is entitled
to and receives, as a matter of right, a de novo review of the Commissioner’s ruling by a three-judge
panel.”).
3. WASH. R. APP. P. 17.7.
4. Either because a party does not file a motion to modify or because a panel denies the motion to
modify.
5. See infra section II.B.1.
6. See infra section II.B.2.
7. The Washington State Supreme Court also has a commissioner’s office. Although this Essay
focuses on the intermediate appellate court, it also references some supreme court decisions.
8. Commissioner decisions are called “rulings,” to distinguish them from full appellate opinions or
orders. WASH. R. APP. P. 17.6(a).
9. See WASH. R. APP. P. 17.2(a), 17.6.
10. RAP 17.2(a) provides:
The judges determine (1) a motion in a brief, (2) a motion to modify a ruling by a commissioner
or the clerk, (3) a motion for reconsideration of a decision, (4) a motion to recall the mandate,
except for a motion made to correct an inadvertently issued mandate, and (5) a motion to publish.
All other motions may be determined initially by a commissioner or the clerk of the appellate
court.
WASH. R. APP. P. 17.2(a).
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rule on all sorts of appellate motions, from minor procedural motions,
such as extension requests,11 to motions that decide the merits of an
appeal, such as motions for accelerated review12 and motions on the
merits.13
Three additional types of motions, all confusingly called “motions for
discretionary review,” require commissioners to serve as gatekeepers to
the court of appeals. A commissioner’s decision granting discretionary
review, thereby allowing a discretionary appeal to go to a panel for a
decision on the merits, can significantly affect the course of an appeal.
Given the effect that a discretionary review ruling may have on the
development of an appeal, this Essay highlights how appellate panels treat
these decisions by appellate commissioners.
The first type of motion for discretionary review is a motion for
interlocutory review.14 In these motions, a party is requesting that the
court of appeals review a superior court’s decision before the trial court
action is over.15 The second is a motion for the court of appeals to hear an
11. See WASH. R. APP. P. 10.2(i), 18.8(a).
12. See WASH. R. APP. P. 18.13 (accelerated review of juvenile dispositions); WASH. R. APP.
P. 18.13A (accelerated review of dependency and termination orders); WASH. R. APP. P. 18.15
(accelerated review of adult sentences).
13. See WASH. R. APP. P. 18.14(a), (d). Currently, all three divisions of the court of appeals have
suspended this rule. See WASH. GEN. ORDS. DIV. II 2016-1.
14. RAP 2.3(b) provides:
[D]iscretionary review may be accepted only in the following circumstances:
(1) The superior court has committed an obvious error which would render further proceedings
useless;
(2) The superior court has committed probable error and the decision of the superior court
substantially alters the status quo or substantially limits the freedom of a party to act;
(3) The superior court has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings, or so far sanctioned such a departure by an inferior court or administrative agency,
as to call for review by the appellate court; or
(4) The superior court has certified, or all the parties to the litigation have stipulated, that the
order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for a
difference of opinion and that immediate review of the order may materially advance the ultimate
termination of the litigation.
WASH. R. APP. P. 2.3(b). The federal standard for interlocutory review tracks RAP 2.3(b)(4), but
without allowing the parties to agree to a certification. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Section 1292(a) also
allows interlocutory appeals of injunctive orders, orders on receiverships, and certain admiralty
orders. Id. § 1292(a).
For a full discussion of the operation of RAP 2.3(b), see Stephen J. Dwyer, Leonard J. Feldman &
Hunter Ferguson, The Confusing Standards for Discretionary Review in Washington and a Proposed
Framework for Clarity, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 91, 105 (2014); and Geoffrey Crooks, Discretionary
Review of Trial Court Decisions Under the Washington Rules of Appellate Procedure, 61 WASH. L.
REV. 1541, 1545 (1986). See also State v. Howland, 180 Wash. App. 196, 321 P.3d 303 (2014)
(discussing WASH. R. APP. P. 2.3(b)(2)), disc. rev. denied, 182 Wash. 2d 1008 (2015).
15. Generally, a trial court must have entered a final judgment in a case before someone can appeal.
WASH. R. APP. P. 2.2(a)(1); see also WASH. R. APP. P. 2.2(a)(2)–(6) (listing specific appealable
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appeal of a limited jurisdiction court16 judgment.17 In these motions, a
superior court first hears the appeal before the losing party asks the court
of appeals to proceed with a second-level appeal.18 Because one court
reviews a judgment before the appeals court exercises its “discretion” to
further review, this second type of motion resembles a petition for a writ
of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court or a petition for review
to the Washington State Supreme Court.19 And the third discretionary
review motion is a motion for direct review in the court of appeals of an
administrative decision, skipping initial review in the superior court.20
Under the discretionary review procedures, the petitioner files a motion
for discretionary review, which is heard by a commissioner. If the
commissioner grants review, a panel of three judges decides the merits of
the appeal.21
But between these two steps—the commissioner’s grant of
discretionary review and the panel reaching the merits of the appeal—a
party who disagrees with the grant of review or its scope may move to
modify the commissioner’s ruling. The motion to modify gives parties the

orders). Interlocutory review is disfavored because
[p]retrial review of rulings confuses the functions of trial and appellate courts. A trial court finds
facts and applies rules and statutes to the issues that arise in the course of a trial. An appellate
court reviews those rulings for legal error and considers the harm of the alleged error in the
context of its impact on the entire trial.
Minehart v. Morning Star Boys Ranch, Inc., 156 Wash. App. 457, 462, 232 P.3d 591, 593–94 (2010).
16. District and municipal courts. See generally WASH. REV. CODE § 3.02.010.
17. These are commonly referred to as “RALJ” motions because the superior court’s appellate
procedures are governed by the Rules for Appeal of Decisions of Courts of Limited Jurisdictions,
cited as “RALJ” rules.
18. RAP 2.3(d) provides:
Discretionary review of a superior court decision entered in a proceeding to review a decision of
a court of limited jurisdiction will be accepted only:
(1) If the decision of the superior court is in conflict with a decision of the Court of Appeals or
the Supreme Court; or
(2) If a significant question of law under the Constitution of the State of Washington or of the
United States is involved; or
(3) If the decision involves an issue of public interest which should be determined by an appellate
court; or
(4) If the superior court has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings, or so far sanctioned such a departure by the court of limited jurisdiction, as to call
for review by the appellate court.
WASH. R. APP. P. 2.3(d).
19. See WASH. R. APP. P. 13.3.
20. Like the RALJ procedures, a party aggrieved by an administrative agency’s final decision may
file an appeal in the superior court. WASH. R. APP. P. 6.3. But see generally S.B. 5225, 2021 Leg.,
67th Sess. (Wash. 2021) (allowing direct appeal to court of appeals of certain land use decisions).
21. The sole exception is a grant of discretionary review in a child welfare case. The RAPs now
allow court commissioners to retain the grant of review and issue a ruling on the merits. WASH. R.
APP. P. 18.13A(a).
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right to internally appeal any commissioner’s decision,22 thus preserving
the losing party’s right to have their issue heard by a panel of elected
appellate judges.23 On the other hand, a commissioner’s ruling may
remain unmodified, either because the losing party did not file a motion
to modify or because a panel denied the motion to modify.
However, even if the commissioner’s ruling remains unmodified,
losing parties may still attempt to adjust the scope of review or challenge
the commissioner’s grant of review altogether. The next section of this
Essay discusses how the court treats the commissioner’s unmodified
decision in the face of such attempts.
II.

THE RULE OF RULING FINALITY

If a commissioner’s ruling remains unmodified, then the losing party’s
right to internally appeal the commissioner’s decision has passed; thus,
the court commissioner’s final decision should be the decision of the
court.24 Multiple opinions recognize this rule, reasoning that by providing
an explicit modification procedure, RAP 17.7 is the exclusive means to
overturn a commissioner’s ruling.25
Essentially, then, courts have acknowledged that a “rule of ruling
finality” exists to enforce the motion to modify procedure. But this rule is
applied inconsistently. For example, when an appellant attempts to add
issues to an appeal after a commissioner accepts discretionary review,
courts consistently will not alter the commissioner’s ruling. In contrast,
when a respondent attempts to limit review, some courts follow the
commissioner’s ruling while others ignore it.
This next section focuses on opinions addressing unmodified grants of
discretionary review. But because how panels treat unmodified
commissioner rulings in other types of motions informs how the rule of
ruling finality is enforced in all circumstances, the next section also
discusses opinions in other contexts.

22. RAP 17.7 sets out that an aggrieved party may object to a commissioner’s ruling “by a motion
to modify the ruling directed to the judges of the court.” WASH. R. APP. P. 17.7.
23. Wolfe v. Wolfe, 99 Wash. 2d 531, 535–36, 663 P.2d 469, 471–72 (1983) (citing WASH. REV.
CODE § 2.06.040 (requiring review by three-judge panels) and Court of Appeals Administrative
Rule 16(c) (Duties of Commissioner)) (“Upon making a motion to modify pursuant to RAP 17.7,
petitioner is entitled to and receives, as a matter of right, a de novo review of the Commissioner’s
ruling by a three-judge panel.”).
24. See infra section II.B.1.
25. Id.
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Expanding the Scope of Review

Several opinions explicitly apply the rule of ruling finality when an
appellant later seeks to add issues to an appeal that a commissioner did
not include in their grant of discretionary review.26 These opinions
consistently hold27 that an appellant cannot add issues to an appeal after a
commissioner accepts review and the commissioner’s decision is not
modified. This category of decision, therefore, consistently applies the
rule of ruling finality.
B.

Attempts to Limit Review

In contrast, the court is more inclined to ignore the rule of ruling finality
when the respondent argues that a panel should later decline to decide
issues that a commissioner included in an unmodified grant of review or
otherwise amend an unmodified commissioner’s ruling. Only a few
opinions squarely address this issue, but panels are split between those
that follow the commissioner’s ruling and those that ignore it. This next
section examines these decisions by division.28

26. Laughlin v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 31612-9-II, 2005 WL 2981685, at *2, (Wash. Ct. App. Nov.
8, 2005) (rejecting appellant’s argument to review all the issues raised in a motion for discretionary
review when the commissioner only granted review of one issue); see also In re Det. of Broer v. State,
93 Wash. App. 852, 857, 957 P.2d 281, 284 (1998) (citing Kramer v. J.I. Case Mfg. Co., 62 Wash.
App. 544, 547, 815 P.2d 798, 801 (1991) (stating that if no motion to modify is filed, “the ruling
becomes a final decision of the court”)), amended by Broer v. State, 973 P.2d 1074 (1999).
In re Detention of Broer implicates both appealability and the scope of review. In that matter, the
commissioner considered whether appeals of four orders entered in a civil commitment proceeding
were properly before the court. 93 Wash. App. at 857, 957 P.2d at 284. The commissioner ruled that
one order, a contempt order, was appealable, and also apparently granted discretionary review of an
order directing a mental examination. Id. In its opinion, the panel noted that neither party moved to
modify the ruling on the scope of review and therefore, the court “confine[d]” itself to reviewing only
the two orders before it. Id.
Also, multiple other decisions that do not specifically cite RAP 17.7 or reference the finality of a
commissioner’s decision also refused to take up additional issues on review. See State v. Kosewicz,
174 Wash. 2d 683, 691 n.2, 278 P.3d 184, 189 n.2 (2012); Frank Coluccio Constr. Co. v. King County,
3 Wash. App. 2d 504, 517, 416 P.3d 756, 762, rev. denied, 192 Wash. 2d 1005 (2018); In re Marriage
of Ruff and Worthley, 198 Wash. App. 419, 424 n.6, 393 P.3d 859, 862 n.6 (2017).
27. See supra note 26.
28. The court of appeals is one court divided into three divisions. WASH. REV. CODE § 2.06.010;
WASH. REV. CODE § 2.06.020; see also WASH. CONST. art. 4, § 30. For a discussion about how the
court of appeals handles conflicting decisions from different divisions, see In re Personal Restraint
of Arnold, 190 Wash. 2d 136, 147–54, 410 P.3d 1133, 1138–41 (2018).
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Cornu-Labat v. Hospital District No. 2 Grant County29 is one of the
clearest recent opinions to address a panel’s authority to avoid issues
included in an unmodified commissioner’s ruling granting review. In
Cornu-Labat, the plaintiff sued a public hospital for failing to comply with
a public records request. The superior court certified for review the issue
whether certain records were exempt from public disclosure. The
appellate commissioner accepted review, and the respondent never moved
to modify.30
In the opinion on review, all three judges agreed that discretionary
review was improper. But even though a concurring judge wished to avoid
reaching the merits by holding that review was improvidently granted, the
majority disagreed. Quoting RAP 17.7, the majority said that the
commissioner’s grant of review was not modified and, therefore, was
final. Consequently, it reached the merits, affirming the trial court’s denial
of summary judgment.31
Division Three similarly rules when addressing unmodified
commissioner rulings in other contexts. For example, in In re Marriage of
Miksch,32 Division Three again deferred to the unmodified
commissioner’s ruling.33 In Miksch, the commissioner denied the
respondent’s motion to dismiss a (non-interlocutory) appeal as moot.34
The respondent failed to move to modify this ruling. Applying CornuLabat, the court declined to address the mootness issue in its opinion.35
And in the recent opinion in Estate of Torres v. Kennewick School
District,36 Division Three once again adhered to its commissioner’s
unmodified ruling on a motion to supplement the appellate record,37 even
though the panel believed that “[t]he issue was debatable.”38

29. No. 32436-2-III, 2015 WL 4740492 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2015).
30. Id. at *6.
31. Id. (applying the law of the case doctrine and affirming denials of summary judgment).
32. No. 35220-0-III, 2018 WL 6002929 (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2018).
33. Id. at *4.
34. Id. at *2.
35. Id.
36. No. 36886-6-III, 2021 WL 5000144 (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2021).
37. RAP 9.11(a) allows the court of appeals to accept additional evidence on review under limited
circumstances if the moving party satisfies six factors. WASH. R. APP. P. 9.11(a)(1)–(6).
38. Est. of Torres, 2021 WL 5000144, at *8.
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Division Two

In an opinion that issued on the same day as Cornu-Labat, Division
Two also refused to alter its commissioner’s ruling granting discretionary
review. In State v. Dickjose,39 the commissioner accepted review of a
denial of a motion to suppress post-arrest statements.40 But on appeal, the
State argued “that the commissioner improvidently granted review.”41 The
court rejected this argument because the State had not moved to modify
the grant of review under RAP 17.7. “Thus, the commissioner’s ruling
granting discretionary review [was] final.”42
This tracks the reasoning of an earlier Division Two opinion in Hough
v. Ballard,43 which addressed appealability.44 In Hough, the respondent
moved to dismiss an appeal, arguing that the matter was not ripe for
review.45 The commissioner denied the motion. Respondent never moved
to modify. Respondent raised the same issue in merits briefing but the
court rejected the argument because the commissioner’s ruling was
final.46
c.

Division One
Division One also follows the rule of ruling finality, although its

39. No. 43659-1-II, 2015 WL 4755525 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2015).
40. Id. at *2.
41. Id. at *2 n.4. Interestingly, Judge Dwyer’s article criticizes the basis for Dickjose’s grant of
review, although it notes that RAP 2.3(b)(1) supported granting review. Dwyer et al., supra note 14,
at 98. This is because the March 2014 opinion in State v. Howland, 180 Wash. App. 196, 207, 321
P.3d 303, 308 (2014), concluded that to satisfy RAP 2.3(b)(2), a petitioner has to show the superior
court’s decision had an effect outside of the litigation. Before that decision and the corresponding
analysis in the law review article, this was not a clearly recognized or uniformly applied requirement.
See, e.g., GMAC v. Everett Chevrolet, Inc., No. 68374-8-I, 2012 WL 3939863, at *6 (Wash. Ct. App.
Aug. 16, 2012) (accepting review of summary judgment denial under RAP 2.3(b)(2)).
The Washington State Supreme Court recently accepted discretionary review in a case that raises
the issue of the proper scope of RAP 2.3(b)(2) and the Supreme Court’s companion rule,
RAP 13.5(b)(2). In re the Welfare of N.G., No. 100008-1 (Wash. Sept. 21, 2021) (order granting
review).
42. Dickjose, 2015 WL 4755525, at *2 n.4 (citing Hough v. Ballard, 108 Wash. App. 272, 277, 31
P.3d 6, 9 (2001)). Similarly, in Michelbrink v. Washington State Patrol, Division Two refused to
reach the issue on whether the commissioner erred in accepting review. 180 Wash. App. 656, 661,
323 P.3d 620, 623 (2014). Michelbrink, however, recognized that the court had already rejected the
same argument when it denied a motion to modify. Id. at 661, 323 P.3d at 623. For this reason, it does
not provide much guidance on the issue of finality of an unmodified commissioner ruling granting
review.
43. 108 Wash. App. 272, 31 P.3d 6 (2001).
44. Id. at 277, 31 P.3d at 9.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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opinions largely arise outside of the discretionary review context.47 They
instead focus on other threshold issues. For example, in Hickel Corp. v.
Richardson,48 Division One refused to readdress an earlier
commissioner’s decision on appealability because the losing party failed
to move to modify the ruling.49
In Kramer v. J.I. Case Manufacturing Co.,50 the respondent believed
that the appellant’s partial record on review was inadequate. Respondent
moved to dismiss, and the commissioner ruled that the appeal could
proceed on the record provided unless a panel later determined it was
inadequate.51 Respondent did not move to modify but rather “attack[ed]”
this ruling in its response brief.52 The panel rejected the challenge, citing
RAP 17.7.53
Also, in Gould v. Mutual Life Insurance Co.,54 the commissioner
entered a ruling that a partial appeal could proceed because the superior
court entered a certification under Civil Rule (CR) 54(b).55 The
respondent challenged the sufficiency of the CR 54(b) certification on
appeal, but the court rejected the argument because the commissioner’s

47. But see supra note 26 and accompanying text for a discussion of In re Det. of Broer, in which
Division One refused to let either party expand the scope of review.
48. No. 78416-1-I, 2019 WL 3555091 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2019).
49. Id. at *4.
50. 62 Wash. App. 544, 547, 815 P.2d 798, 801 (1991). Kramer is often cited by other divisions
when discussing RAP 17.7 and the finality of commissioner decisions. See generally Est. of Torres
v. Kennewick Sch. Dist., No. 36886-6-III, 2021 WL 5000144, at *8 (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2021).
51. Kramer, 62 Wash. App. at 547, 815 P.2d at 801.
52. Id.
53. Id. The court also independently determined that the record was sufficient. Id.
54. 37 Wash. App. 756, 683 P.2d 207 (1984). Two Division One opinions also address the finality
of commissioner rulings issued in earlier appeals that were related to the later appeal before the panel.
In Fluor Enterprises, Inc. v. Walter Construction, Ltd., 141 Wash. App. 761, 172 P.3d 368 (2007)
(published in part), the court addressed the effect of a commissioner’s decision dismissing an earlier
appeal as nonfinal. Although the court concluded that the earlier commissioner decision was not the
law of the case because the issue it addressed was not identical to an issue raised in the later appeal,
the court recognized the general rule that “[a] commissioner’s ruling becomes a final decision of this
court if an aggrieved party fails to seek modification of the ruling within the time permitted by
RAP 17.7.” Id. § III of unpublished portion of the opinion. And in In re Marriage of Daly, No. 398181-I, 1998 WL 62863 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 17, 1998), a commissioner ruled in a motion on the merits
to affirm the superior court’s order in a dissolution action that ordered the sale of the family home
and directed how to distribute the proceeds. Neither party moved to modify. Id. at *1. The husband
later moved to enforce the decree of dissolution and house sale and the superior court modified the
post-sale distribution calculation. Id. at *2. He appealed the superior court’s alteration of the
distribution calculation. Id. In the opinion rejecting the superior court’s distribution modification, the
court noted that the appellate commissioner’s earlier affirmance of the distribution plan was “the final
decision of the court.” Id. at *1 (citing Kramer, 62 Wash. App. at 547, 815 P.2d at 801).
55. See Gould, 37 Wash. App. at 758, 683 P.2d at 208. CR 54(b) allows a superior court to certify
a partial final judgment for immediate review.
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appealability determination was not modified.56
2.

Panel Ignores the Commissioner’s Ruling

As just shown, many opinions uphold the rule of ruling finality. But
there are plenty of opinions that functionally modify a previously
unmodified commissioner’s ruling for all sorts of reasons. The following
sections will first review appeals that squarely raise the issue of ruling
finality and the role of RAP 17.7, but do not adhere to the commissioner’s
ruling. The Essay will then examine appeals in which the court issued
opinions that functionally modified earlier commissioner rulings but did
not cite RAP 17.7 or discuss ruling finality. Again, the focus is on
opinions modifying the scope of a commissioner’s grant of discretionary
review, but these sections also include other opinions that give insight into
the court’s treatment of commissioner rulings.
a.

State v. Kibbee

Despite Division Two’s clear statement in Dickjose that an unmodified
commissioner ruling granting review is final,57 the court in State v.
Kibbee58 narrowed the commissioner’s unmodified grant of discretionary
review.59 The procedural history of this matter is unique, but the opinion
is examined in detail here because the petitioner raised the ruling finality
issue in a motion for reconsideration and in a petition for review to our
supreme court.
In Kibbee, the commissioner granted discretionary review under
RAP 2.3(d) of a judicial bias and appearance of fairness issue because the
motion raised an issue of public interest.60 The commissioner also

56. Id.
57. See State v. Dickjose, No. 43659-1-II, 2015 WL 4755525, at *2 n. 4 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 11,
2015) (citing Hough v. Ballard, 108 Wash. App. 272, 277, 31 P.3d 6, 9 (2001)) (“[T]he State did not
file a motion to modify the commissioner’s ruling . . . . Thus, the commissioner’s ruling granting
discretionary review is final.”).
58. No. 50633-5-II, 2019 WL 5188613 (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2019).
59. See id. at *2–3.
60. State v. Kibbee, No. 50633-5-II, at 7 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2018) (commissioner ruling
granting review) (citing RAP 2.3(d)(3)). The appearance of fairness issue arose from statements the
judge made at arraignment that Marine Corps veterans cannot control themselves (the defendant was
a veteran), plus these post-sentencing events:
After completion of [his video sentencing] hearing, Kibbee walked out of view of the camera. A
corrections officer then walked into the view of the camera. As the officer walked back out of
view, the court stated, “You better say goodbye.” The officer then returned and pulled down a
sign which read “goodbye” above a big, yellow smiley face. The court laughed and clapped and
said, “Bravo.”
Kibbee, 2019 WL 5188613, at *2 (citations omitted).
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accepted review of a previously unraised sufficiency of the evidence issue
under RAP 2.3(e),61 without conducting a separate analysis of this issue
under RAP 2.3(d).62 The ruling granting review highlighted that the
challenging party may raise a sufficiency of the evidence issue for the first
time on review.63 The State never moved to modify this ruling.64
Nevertheless, in its response brief in the merits appeal, the State
challenged the commissioner’s grant of review on the sufficiency of the
evidence issue.65 In its opinion, the court agreed that the commissioner
improvidently granted review because the issue was not eligible for
review under RAP 2.3(d).66 The opinion did not cite RAP 17.7 or
distinguish other Division Two opinions, such as Dickjose, that applied
the rule of ruling finality.
The appellant moved for reconsideration. The reconsideration motion
squarely argued that the unmodified commissioner ruling was the final
decision of the court of appeals and, therefore, the panel had an obligation
to reach the sufficiency of the evidence issue.67 The State responded that
the appellant could have raised this argument in his reply brief, but did
not file one.68 And because he failed to bring this argument to the court’s
attention, the State asserted that RAP 12.4, the reconsideration rule, did
61. WASH. R. APP. P. 2.3(e).
62. Kibbee, No. 50633-5-II, at 7–8 (commissioner ruling granting review). Recall that in motions
for discretionary review of limited jurisdiction court decisions under RAP 2.3(d), the petitioner has
already had their appeal as of right heard by a county superior court. See WASH. R. APP. P. 2.3(d)
(discussing discretionary review of “a superior court decision entered in a proceeding to review a
decision of a court of limited jurisdiction”).
63. Kibbee, No. 50633-5-II, at 8 (commissioner ruling granting review) (citing WASH. R. APP.
P. 2.5(a)(2)).
64. WASH. R. APP. P. 17.7.
65. Brief of the Respondent at 6–8, Kibbee, No. 50633-5-II, 2019 WL 5188613.
66. Kibbee, 2019 WL 5188613, at *2. The court, therefore, conducted its own analysis of the
sufficiency issue under RAP 2.3(d) and rejected review. Id. at *3.
Although the opinion seemingly rejected review of the sufficiency of the evidence issue, the court
ultimately partially reached the merits of the issue and remanded for the superior court to strike the
domestic violence designations from the judgment and sentence, because in its briefing to the panel,
the State conceded that there was no evidence that the convictions involved domestic violence. Id. at
*3–4 (citing WASH. R. APP. P. 1.2(a)). The State had not conceded this issue in its four-page answer
to the petitioner’s motion for discretionary review. See Brief of Respondent in Opposition to Motion
for Discretionary Review, Kibbee, No. 50633-5-II, 2019 WL 5188613.
In addition, the opinion implicitly assumed RAP 2.3(e) did not permit the commissioner to add
issues on review once they determined at least one issue satisfied RAP 2.3. The operation of
RAP 2.3(e) and whether it allows a commissioner to add issues on review once they conclude at least
one issue satisfies RAP 2.3(b) or (d) is outside the scope of this Essay.
67. Motion for Reconsideration at 5–7, Kibbee, No. 50633-5-II, 2019 WL 5188613 (citing WASH.
R. APP. P. 17.7).
68. Respondent’s Reply to Appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration at 2–3, Kibbee, No. 50633-5II, 2019 WL 5188613 (citing WASH. R. APP. P. 12.4).
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not support the motion.69 The court denied the motion for
reconsideration.70
The appellant then petitioned our supreme court to review whether the
panel could refuse to consider his sufficiency of the evidence argument.71
The court denied review.72
Although Kibbee never resulted in an order or opinion accepting or
rejecting the rule of ruling finality, the post-opinion briefing squarely
raised the issue. And had the finality issue been raised before the
reconsideration stage, the Kibbee panel may have had to explain why it
ignored the rule of ruling finality in altering—specifically, limiting—the
scope of an unmodified grant of discretionary review.
b.

Child Welfare Caption

A 2019 ruling from Division One in a child welfare matter also calls
into question the finality of unmodified commissioner rulings. Like
Kibbee, this ruling also involved post-decision briefing squarely
presenting the finality issue.
In In re Dependency of A.S.,73 a child welfare appeal with no pending
motion to modify, Division One sua sponte ordered the withdrawal of a
commissioner ruling.74 In that matter, the commissioner had granted a
mother’s motion to correct a case title to remove her full name from the
caption.75 No party moved to modify. But shortly after granting the motion
to change the caption, the commissioner entered a short order that stated
that, at the direction of the chief judge, the court was withdrawing the
69. Id. RAP 12.4(c) requires that a reconsideration motion “state with particularity the points of
law or fact which the moving party contends the court has overlooked or misapprehended, together
with a brief argument on the points raised.” WASH. R. APP. P. 12.4(c) (emphasis added).
At least one (unpublished) opinion addresses whether a motion for reconsideration is proper when
the moving party did not raise the reconsideration argument in its merits briefing. In State v. Cruz
Tellez, No. 33552-6-III, 2016 WL 5415963 (Wash. Ct. App. July 19, 2016), Division Three granted
a motion for reconsideration on the issue of legal financial obligations, over a partial dissent. Id. at
*1. The dissenting judge argued, “This court could not possibly have overlooked or misapprehended
any point of law or fact bearing on the State’s right to request an award of costs, because our discretion
to deny costs was never mentioned or suggested by anything in Mr. Cruz Tellez’s briefing.” Id. at *3
(Siddoway, J., dissenting).
70. State v. Kibbee, No. 50633-5-II (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 4, 2019) (order denying motion for
reconsideration).
71. Petition for Review at 7–9, Kibbee, No. 50633-5-II, 2019 WL 518863 (citing WASH. R. APP.
P. 17.7 and Kramer v. J.I. Case Mfg. Co., 62 Wash. App. 544, 546–47, 815 P.2d 798, 800–01 (1991)).
72. State v. Kibbee, 195 Wash. 2d 1013, 460 P.3d 180 (2020) (order denying review).
73. No. 80713-7-I, 2020 WL 4284614 (Wash. Ct. App. July 27, 2020).
74. In re Dependency of A.S., No. 80713-7-I (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 5, 2019) (commissioner ruling
granting motion to correct the case title).
75. Id. (citing WASH. R. APP. P. 3.4).
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previous ruling and denying the motion to change the caption.76
Ultimately, the caption issue reached our supreme court on a motion for
discretionary review.77
The mother’s supreme court motion argued in part that no rule allows
a court on its own accord to modify a commissioner’s ruling.78 The
supreme court took review and remanded to remove the mother’s name
from the caption, citing RAP 3.4.79 Granted, this dispute arose in the
context of an isolated incident arising from a (now settled) inter-divisional
dispute about proper captions in child welfare matters. Nevertheless, the
rule of ruling finality provided the mother with a strong argument in her
petition for review. And because our supreme court remanded, the
outcome may support a conclusion that the rule of ruling finality required
this outcome.
c.

Improvidently Granted

This Essay has not yet addressed in detail the primary reason our state’s
courts use to pare down the scope of review: that discretionary review was
improvidently granted. Unlike some of the opinions discussed earlier,
none of these decisions cite RAP 17.7 or squarely address the rule of
ruling finality.80 For these reasons, they are of limited use in attempting to
76. In re Dependency of A.S., No. 80713-7-I (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 6, 2019) (commissioner ruling
denying motion to correct the case title).
77. In re Dependency of A.S., No. 98403-4 (Wash. July 8, 2020) (order granting review). And in
In re Welfare of K.D., 198 Wash. 2d 67, 491 P.3d 154 (2021), the Supreme Court of Washington held
that the court of appeals should not add parents’ full names to the case title in child welfare appeals.
Id. at 70.
78. Motion for Discretionary Review at 7, In re A.S., No. 80713-7-I, 2020 WL 4284614 (citing
WASH. R. APP. P. 17.7(a)).
79. In re A.S., No. 98403-4 (order granting review). Post-remand and under the revised caption,
Division One issued a decision affirming the termination of the mother’s parental rights. No. 807137-I, 2020 WL 4284614, at *1. Then, the state supreme court again took discretionary review and
remanded for further proceedings consistent with In re Dependency of Z.J.G., 196 Wash. 2d 152, 471
P.3d 853 (2020), an opinion setting out the requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act. In re
Dependency of A.S., No. 98403-4 (Wash. Dec. 2, 2020) (order granting review).
80. There are approximately twenty intermediate appellate opinions that do this. See, e.g., Wash.
State Dep’t of Transp. v. Seattle Tunnel Partners, No. 51025-1-II, 2019 WL 453763, at *7–8 (Wash.
Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2019) (reversing denial of summary judgment on contract statute of limitations but
refusing to decide related argument on indemnity claims); Vargas ex rel Dussault v. Inland Wash.,
LLC (Vargas I), No. 76717-8-I, 2018 WL 4414639, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2018) (declining
to hear grant of review under RAP 2.3(b)(4) due to intervening Washington State Supreme Court
decision) (see infra note 93 on additional history of Vargas I); Vargas ex rel Dussault v. Ralph’s
Concrete Pumping, Inc. (Vargas II), No. 76893-0-I, 2018 WL 4408985, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. Sept.
17, 2018) (same); Triplett v. Wash. State Dept. of Soc. & Health Servs., 193 Wash. App. 497, 532–
33, 373 P.3d 279, 296 (2016) (concluding RAP 2.3(b) discretionary review of one issue was
improvidently granted); State v. Gishuru, No. 72142-9-I, 2015 WL 7722995, at *1–2 (Wash. Ct. App.
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determine why the panel ignored the rule of ruling finality. But because
they functionally reject the rule, they are categorized and discussed.
Two Washington State Supreme Court opinions reference an
improvident grant of discretionary review by a commissioner or take issue
with a related commissioner motion ruling.81 In State v. Halstien,82 our
supreme court determined that its commissioner improvidently granted an
appellant’s motion to supplement its petition for review.83 The Court
added that the appellant never presented the supplemental issue to the

Nov. 30, 2015) (rejecting RAP 2.3(d) review as improvidently granted because the issue was not
preserved, but noting the commissioner sent the preservation issue to the panel); City of Lakewood
v. Willis, No. 45034-8-II, 2015 WL 1552179, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2016) (concluding that
the court improvidently granted review of an equal protection issue), rev’d on First Amendment
grounds, 186 Wash. 2d 210, 375 P.3d 1056 (2016); Eastman v. Puget Sound Builders NW., Inc.,
No. 42013-9-II, 2012 WL 5349186, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. Sept. 11 , 2012) (dismissing appeal because
the court improvidently granted review); Kantola v. Juvinall, No. 37537-1-II, 2009 WL 1212270, at
*3–5 (Wash. Ct. App. May 5, 2009) (dismissing interlocutory appeal as improvidently granted
because there was no obvious or probable error but also reaching the merits of the discovery dispute
and concluding the trial court did not abuse its discretion); State v. Mills, No. 31786-9-II, 2005 WL
3048020, at *2 (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2005) (refusing to hear one issue on discretionary review);
Brundridge v. Fluor Hanford, Inc., No. 22058-3-III, 2004 WL 898279, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr.
27, 2004) (dismissing appeal because review was improvidently granted); Taplett v. Major Mktg.
Servs., Inc., No. 20112-1-III, 2002 WL 398492, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2002) (same); Mensch
v. Pollard, No. 43687-2-I, 2000 WL 62968, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2000) (same); State v.
Smith, 90 Wash. App. 856, 862, 954 P.2d 362, 366 (1998) (same).
In addition, the previously discussed opinion in Kibbee also uses the phrase “improvidently
granted.” State v. Kibbee, No. 50633-5-II, 2019 WL 5188613, at *3 (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2019).
But this Essay addresses Kibbee separately because the appellant, on reconsideration, argued against
rejecting review for this reason, which squarely presented the RAP 17.7 issue to the panel, albeit after
it issued its merits opinion. See Motion for Reconsideration at 5–6, Kibbee, No. 50633-5-II, 2019 WL
5188613 (citing WASH. R. APP. P. 17.7).
81. These discretionary review cases need to be distinguished from the occasional decisions by our
supreme court that decline to rule on appeals that come before it on a grant of a petition for review,
as opposed to those that come to the court on a motion for discretionary review heard by the supreme
court commissioner. See, e.g., In re Det. of Sease, 366 P.3d 438, 438 (Wash. 2016) (mem.) (dismissing
petition for review as improvidently granted). For petitions for review to our supreme court, a
commissioner does not grant review; rather, a division of the court, made up of four justices and the
chief justice, decides whether to grant review. See State v. Bueno, 288 P.3d 328, 328 (Wash. 2012)
(mem.). Because these cases do not involve the finality of a commissioner ruling, they are outside the
scope of this Essay.
For a discussion of United States Supreme Court orders dismissing review as improvidently
granted, see Stephen L. Wasby, Steven Peterson, James Schubert & Glendon Schubert, The Supreme
Court’s Use of Per Curiam Dispositions: The Connection to Oral Argument, 13 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 1
(1992). Unlike our state supreme court, the United States Supreme Court needs only four justices to
accept review, but five to affirm or reverse once review is accepted. Id. at 21–22; see also Joan Maisel
Leiman, The Rule of Four, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 975, 987 (1957).
82. 122 Wash. 2d 109, 857 P.2d 270 (1993).
83. Id. at 130, 857 P.2d at 282. There is nothing in the opinion that shows the respondent moved to
modify.
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court of appeals and that it was also not ripe.84 Conversely, in Hojem v.
Kelly,85 although the Court questioned whether discretionary review was
improvidently granted, it affirmed on the merits.86
Halstien could support ignoring the rule of ruling finality when a party
later raises a justiciability issue, such as ripeness. However, because
Halstien involved a preliminary procedural ruling and because the Court’s
underlying authority to review the supplemental issue was questionable,87
it provides little guidance otherwise. In contrast, because the Court
reached the merits of the appeal in Hojem even after questioning whether
review was appropriate,88 it arguably preserved the integrity of the
commissioner’s grant of review.
The myriad court of appeals decisions that reject discretionary review
as improvidently granted89 can be grouped into a few different categories.
First, there are opinions that, like Hojem, discuss at least the merits of
some of the issues on appeal while also questioning whether review was
improvidently granted.90 Some of these opinions ultimately appear to say
there was no error and, as a result, the petitioner-appellant also failed to
show that the superior court committed an obvious or probable error91 to
support discretionary review. Others reached the primary issue on review
but declined to reach minor subsidiary issues. Because these cases
addressed the merits in some fashion, they do not provide much insight
into the finality of the commissioner’s grant of review.
Second, there are cases in which an intervening decision, a new statute,
or subsequent events caused the court to later question the commissioner’s

84. Id.
85. 93 Wash. 2d 143, 606 P.2d 275 (1980).
86. Id. at 144, 606 P.2d at 276.
87. It had not been preserved and was not ripe for review. Halstien, 122 Wash. 2d at 129–30, 857
P.2d at 282.
88. Hojem, 93 Wash. 2d at 147–48, 606 P.2d at 278.
89. See cases cited supra note 80 and accompanying text.
90. Triplett v. Wash. State Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 193 Wash. App. 497, 532–33, 193 P.3d
279, 296 (refusing to address trial court’s discovery decisions after reaching the merits of a qualified
immunity issue); Eastman v. Puget Sound Builders NW., Inc., No. 42013-9-II, 2012 WL 5349186, at
*2–3 (Wash. Ct. App. Sept. 11, 2012) (noting the commissioner granted review of issue whether
builders owed any duty to plaintiff, court determined that the builder may have had a contractual duty
but because this issue was not addressed in the superior court and further proceedings were not
useless, it dismissed the appeal and remanded); Kantola v. Juvinall, No. 37537-1-II, 2009 WL
1212270, at *4–5 (Wash. Ct. App. May 5, 2009) (finding no abuse of discretion in order limiting
discovery and also concluding review should not have been granted); State v. Smith, 90 Wash. App.
856, 862, 954 P.2d 362, 366 (concluding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in lineup
procedures and holding that motion for discretionary review was improvidently granted).
91. WASH. R. APP. P. 2.3(b)(1)–(2).
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earlier grant of review. For example, in its two Vargas (I & II)92 decisions,
Division One declined to hear a grant of review under RAP 2.3(b)(4) due
to an intervening supreme court decision.93 Likewise in Kantola v.
Juvinall,94 the court dismissed the appeal of a limitation on discovery
because the appellant ultimately never engaged in the allowed discovery
nor sought additional discovery.95 Because a commissioner’s grant of
review can occur more than a year before a panel issues an opinion, it is
understandable that intervening decisions or events would occasionally
cause a panel to later reject review.
Third, there are two opinions that cite another court rule, RAP 7.3, to
support a panel’s power to reject a grant of discretionary review.96
92. Vargas ex rel Dussault v. Inland Wash., LLC (Vargas I), No. 76717-8-I, 2018 WL 4414639
(Wash. Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2018); Vargas ex rel Dussault v. Ralph’s Concrete Pumping, Inc. (Vargas
II), No.76893-0-I, 2018 WL 4408985 (Wash. Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2018).
93. Vargas I, No. 76717-8-I, 2018 WL 4414639, at *1 (citing Afoa v. Port of Seattle, 191 Wash.
2d 110, 421 P.3d 903 (2018)); Vargas II, 2018 WL 4408995, at *1. But the losing party in Vargas I
still moved for discretionary review in our supreme court. Vargas II, 194 Wash. 2d 720, 727, 452
P.3d 1205, 1210 (2019). The Court took discretionary review of the dismissal and the underlying
merits of the case. Id. at 727, 452 P.3d at 1210. The Court ultimately reached the merits because it
determined that the Vargas’s discretionary review motion satisfied the Court’s own discretionary
review rule, RAP 3.5, which largely tracks RAP 2.3(b)(1)–(3). Id. at 728, 452 P.3d at 1211. In so
doing, it rejected another request by Inland Washington to “dismiss this case as improvidently
granted.” Id. But see City of Seattle v. Weatherford, No. 76352-1-I, 2018 WL 3122321, at *1 (Wash.
Ct. App. June 25, 2018) (rejecting respondent’s argument that a later statutory amendment settled the
issue because the statute had not been amended at the time the appellant was sentenced).
94. No. 37537-1-II, 2009 WL 1212270 (Wash. Ct. App. May 5, 2009).
95. Id. at *5 (as previously mentioned, supra note 80, the Kantola court also touched on the merits
of the discovery dispute); see also Mensch v. Pollard, No. 43687-2-I, 2000 WL 62968, at *1 (Wash.
Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2000) (refusing to review a superior court’s decision to bar expert testimony because
it remained possible that lay testimony could open the door to expert testimony, and “because we are
unable to predict and do not wish to presume what may happen at trial, we cannot address the issues
on appeal adequately at this time”).
96. Wash. State Dep’t of Transp. v. Seattle Tunnel Partners, No. 51025-1-II, 2019 WL 453763, at
*8 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2019) (refusing to reach implied indemnity issues on appeal because the
argument was not properly raised in the superior court); Kantola, No. 37537-1-II, 2009 WL 1212270,
at *4–5 (noting that the record was not fully developed); cf. Kramer v. J.I. Case Mfg. Co., 62 Wash.
App. 544, 547, 815 P.2d 798, 801 (refusing to set aside commissioner’s ruling that record was
sufficient for review and also independently determining the record was sufficient). Note, however,
in Kramer, that the commissioner’s ruling explicitly allowed the panel to reassess the sufficiency of
the record in its review. 62 Wash. App. at 547, 815 P.2d at 800–01.
Interestingly, in Seattle Tunnel Partners, the respondent actually had moved to modify the scope
of review. Seattle Tunnel Partners’ Motion to Modify Commissioner’s Ruling, Seattle Tunnel
Partners, No. 51025-1-II, 2019 WL 453763. One argument was that the trial court did not properly
address the indemnity issues, so they should not be addressed on discretionary review. Id. at *4. It
also argued that further proceedings were not rendered useless under RAP 2.3(b)(1) because the
indemnity claims were not subject to the same statute of limitations as the tort claims. Id. at *11. The
motions panel denied the motion to modify. Wash. State Dep’t of Transp. v. Seattle Tunnel Partners,
No. 51025-1-II (Wash. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 2018) (amended order denying motion to modify).
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RAP 7.3 is a very broad rule:
The appellate court has the authority to determine whether a
matter is properly before it, and to perform all acts necessary or
appropriate to secure the fair and orderly review of a case. The
Court of Appeals retains authority to act in a case pending before
it until review is accepted by the Supreme Court, unless the
Supreme Court directs otherwise.97
And these two opinions read the expansive language in RAP 7.3 to
grant appellate panels the ability to disregard unmodified commissioner
rulings.98 But because RAP 7.3 sets out a general rule, in that it does not
directly address commissioner rulings or the modification process, it
stretches logic and ignores the standards governing court rule
interpretation to argue that it grants a panel unrestricted power to ignore
RAP 17.7.99 In addition, apart from these two cases, the court of appeals
generally uses RAP 7.3 for case administration matters rather than to
modify rulings.100
Fourth, there is one opinion that uses the text of RAP 2.3(b) itself to
Interestingly, two of the three judges on the motions panel were on the merits panel, including the
opinion’s author. Compare id. (order by judges Worswick, Lee & Sutton), with Seattle Tunnel
Partners, 2019 WL 453763 at *1, 8 (opinion by judges Sutton, Worswick & Melnick).
97. WASH. R. APP. P. 7.3.
98. See Seattle Tunnel Partners, 2019 WL 453763, at *8; Kantola, 2009 WL 1212270, at *5.
99. Washington courts use statutory interpretation principles to interpret court rules. Jafar v. Webb,
177 Wash. 2d 520, 527, 303 P.3d 1042, 1045 (2013). And these principles include that specific rules
or statutes govern over general ones where they “pertain to the same subject matter and conflict to the
extent they cannot be harmonized.” In re Est. of Kerr, 134 Wash. 2d 328, 343, 949 P.2d 810, 817
(1998).
100. See Major Prods. Co. v. Nw. Harvest Prods., Inc., 96 Wash. App. 405, 409, 979 P.2d 905, 907
(1999) (“The appointment [of counsel] falls within the scope of RAP 7.3 as an appropriate action to
secure the fair and orderly review of this case.”); State v. Walker, 153 Wash. App. 701, 708–09, 224
P.3d 814, 818 (2009) (finding that judicial economy favored remanding to allow superior court to
enter factual findings on issue raised for the first time on review).
Ultimately, RAP 7.3 may support a panel’s decision to limit review in narrow circumstances when
administrative matters make review impossible, such as when the documents submitted in support of
the motion for discretionary review supported review but the later-received formal record on review
proved insufficient to reach the merits. See Kantola, No. 37537-1-II, 2009 WL 1212270, at *4–5
(noting that the record was not fully developed); see also City of Lakewood v. Willis, No. 45034-8II, 2015 WL 1552179, at *5 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2015) (reaching First Amendment challenge but
concluding equal protection challenge lacked an adequate record), rev’d on First Amendment
grounds, 186 Wash. 2d 210, 375 P.3d 1056 (2016); State v. Mills, No. 31786-9-II, 2005 WL 3048020,
at *2, 3 (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2005) (addressing the merits of one issue but refusing to review
two claims due to an insufficient record).
This is because motions to the appellate court are supported by documents attached as appendices
to the motion, WASH. R. APP. P. 17.3(b)(8), while full appeals, including on grants of discretionary
review, have the benefit of a full appellate record. WASH. R. APP. P. 9.1. Because a motion to modify
generally needs to be filed within thirty days of the commissioner’s ruling, WASH. R. APP. P. 17.7(a),
both the commissioner and the modification panel do not have the benefit of the full record.
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support that a panel can overrule a commissioner’s grant of review. In
Boone v. City of Seattle,101 a panel rejected a grant of review under
RAP 2.3(b)(4).102 The opinion quotes the opening sentence of
RAP 2.3(b), “discretionary review may be granted,” in concluding that
discretionary review was inappropriate because it was “not clear what
benefits would result from immediate review.”103 While the reasoning is
creative, this analysis ignores RAP 17.7104 and the fact that
commissioners handle discretionary review motion practice under
RAP 2.3(b).
Finally, there are other cases that reject discretionary review as
improvidently granted for a few different reasons but without much
analysis.105 They are mentioned here only because they do not clearly fall
into any other category.
III. FINALITY IS PREFERRED
Under RAP 17.7, any party dissatisfied with a commissioner ruling can
file a motion to modify. The necessary corollary is that unmodified

101. No. 73534-9-I, 2016 WL 1735487 (Wash. Ct. App. May 2, 2016).
102. Id. at *1.
103. Id. (emphasis in original). Although the opinion does not expand on this, it is well accepted
that even if a petitioner satisfies RAP 2.3(b), the court is not required to take review. Washington
courts use statutory interpretation principles to interpret court rules. Jafar, 177 Wash. 2d at 527, 303
P.3d at 1045. “May” in a statute means that the provision is permissive and not binding. Scannell v.
City of Seattle, 97 Wash. 2d 701, 704, 648 P.2d 435, 438 (1982).
104. As discussed supra notes 99 and 103, Washington courts use statutory interpretation principles
to interpret court rules and that means that specific rules or statutes govern over general ones where
the rules conflict and cannot be harmonized. See In re Est. of Kerr, 134 Wash. 2d 328, 343, 949 P.2d
810, 817 (1998). Because RAP 2.3(b) refers to the initial request for review and RAP 17.7 specifically
addresses how to object to a RAP 2.3(b) ruling, it is a stretch to conclude that RAP 2.3(b)’s use of
“may” silently abrogates RAP 17.7 on interlocutory review.
105. Brundridge v. Fluor Hanford, Inc., No. 22058-3-III, 2004 WL 898279, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App.
Apr. 27, 2004) (concluding RAP 2.3(b)(2)’s effect prong was not satisfied in challenge to the
exclusion of evidence pursuant to motions in limine); Taplett v. Major Mktg. Servs., Inc., No. 201121-III, 2002 WL 398492, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2002) (refusing to render an advisory opinion
on RAP 2.3(b)(4) review). Taplett, however, may fall into the same justiciability category as the
supreme court’s Halstien decision. See State v. Halstien, 122 Wash. 2d 109, 129–30, 857 P.2d 270,
282 (1993); see also supra notes 81–87 and accompanying text. Similarly, in a 2003 decision, Blas’
v. Goethals, No. 29047-2-II, 2003 WL 22333201, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 14, 2003), the panel
actually rewrote the issue on RAP 2.3(d) review to avoid rendering an advisory opinion. See id. (“In
our opinion, limiting our review of this case to the issue on which discretionary review was granted
would result in an improper advisory opinion.”). In Blas’, it appears the parties presented the amended
issue to the court. See id. (“[W]e address the dispositive issue in the case as it came before us, even
though it differs from the issue raised during the motion for discretionary review.”). Finally, it should
be added that the Boone opinion rejecting review, see supra notes 101–104, touched on a justiciability
issue, namely the statutory amount in controversy limitation for the court of appeals. Boone, 2016
WL 1735487, at *1 & n.2 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 2.06.030).
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commissioner rulings are final. And, except in very limited circumstances,
they should be—for a number of reasons.
First, RAP 17.7 is unambiguous. It sets out how to request panel review
of an issue decided by a commissioner. It does not have any listed
exceptions or allow the commissioner’s ruling to be challenged in later
merits briefing. The motion to modify procedures undergird the rule of
ruling finality.
Second, and related to the above, the commissioner plays a vital role in
our appellate courts.106 By acting as gatekeepers for discretionary review
motions and in ruling on other quasi-substantive threshold matters, such
as appealability, the commissioner frees panels to focus on the merits of
appeals. The rule of ruling finality supports this by preventing parties from
re-raising already adjudicated threshold issues.
Third, inconsistent treatment of unmodified commissioner rulings by
appellate panels creates inconsistent law and uncertainty for parties. A
party who prevails before a commissioner and reaches a panel should have
some confidence in the finality of any unmodified ruling. Absent this, the
prevailing party is left in the position of having to predict arguments and
proactively defend earlier commissioner rulings in later merits briefing,
wasting the panel’s time and the litigants’ money.
Fourth, and related to the above, in the discretionary review context,
the scope of an appeal is determined by the discretionary review ruling. If
a party believes that certain issues should not be heard on the merits, it
should raise these in a motion to modify before the extensive and
expensive appellate record perfection process occurs and before the
parties have to submit merits briefing on all of the issues before the court.
If this does not happen, any respondent can ambush an ongoing appeal by
trying to reshape its scope in its response brief.
Fifth, the commissioner motion process gives parties access to a
relatively swift procedure for identifying material threshold appellate
issues. In our courts, motion briefing and setting happens in a matter of
weeks or months, but it can take a year or more to perfect and receive an
appellate opinion. And outside the discretionary review context, if a party
still would rather have a panel rule on an issue that would “preclude
hearing the case on the merits,” they can present such a motion in their
brief.107
Sixth, and of particular importance to interlocutory appeals, any

106. See Wolfe v. Wolfe, 99 Wash. 2d 531, 534–37, 663 P.2d 469, 471–72 (1983); see also supra
note 1.
107. WASH. R. APP. P. 17.4(d).
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interlocutory appeal interferes with a pending superior court action.108 If
interlocutory review of some or all issues is unwarranted, this should be
determined as early in the appellate process as possible. Hence, the
discretionary review motion procedure puts the matter before a
commissioner in a fairly expedited manner. And through the frontloaded
commissioner’s ruling and related modification procedure, parties can
determine what issues, if any, require immediate appellate attention.
Allowing a party to later argue that a commissioner should never have
accepted discretionary review results in an avoidable delay in the superior
court.109
For these reasons, only in rare circumstances should a panel depart
from the rule of ruling finality. Some circumstances may include when
there is an intervening change in the law relied on by the commissioner,110
when the perfected appellate record shows that the grant of review was
inappropriate,111 or when the court encounters a previously unidentified
justiciability concern.112 And when a panel does not treat a
commissioner’s ruling as final, the opinion should squarely discuss the
rule of ruling finality and set out clear reasons for departing from it.
CONCLUSION
Myriad opinions follow RAP 17.7 and enforce the rule of ruling
finality. But some do not—often with little or no explanation. For the
reasons just stated, this gray area in appellate practice should be
eliminated in all but the rarest circumstances. When a panel disregards the
rule of ruling finality, it essentially disregards RAP 17.7 and the line of
cases enforcing that rule. In practice, the panel must distinguish these
cases, and its opinion should include the reasons for rejecting the finality
of an unmodified commissioner’s ruling. In this way, our appellate court
system can develop predictable and coherent appellate practice
jurisprudence to support its unique and efficient commissioner system.

108. See Minehart v. Morning Star Boys Ranch, Inc., 156 Wash. App. 457, 462, 232 P.3d 591, 593
(2010) (noting that piecemeal appeals should be avoided (citing Maybury v. City of Seattle, 53 Wash.
2d 716, 721, 336 P.2d 878, 883 (1959)).
109. See WASH. R. APP. P. 7.2 (limiting the superior court’s power to act while an appeal is
pending).
110. See supra notes 92–93 and accompanying text (Vargas I & II).
111. See supra note 100.
112. See supra notes 82–84, 105 and accompanying text.

